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"The Robots are Coming"
Introduction
In the past year or so there have been cover stories or 
special reports about robots in Time, Newsweek, Fortune, 
Business Week, and The Wall Street Journal, among others. 
Indeed, the existence of a robot "revolution" in our fac 
tories appears to be treated as a fact in the popular media. 
Yet there is surprisingly little information available about the 
possible social and economic implications of robots. How 
many robots are toiling in our factories today? Which jobs 
and how many will be done by robots that were once done by 
human workers? What new jobs and how many will be 
created by robots? In such an information vacuum it is easy 
to exaggerate or to misunderstand the few facts that are 
available; possible even to inadvertently mislead 
policymakers and the general public as to the impact of 
robots.
A recent study by Pat Choate warns of the imminent 
robotization of American factories. He says "the speed and 
force of this change will be awesome." (Choate, p. 13) He 
concludes, "As the economy robotizes and domestic jobs are 
lost to foreign production, 10 million to 15 million manufac 
turing workers and a similar number of service workers like 
ly will be displaced from their existing jobs. Much of this
l
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displacement will occur in the mid- to late 1980s." (Choate, 
p. 2) Yet nowhere in the study does Choate really say how 
many jobs will be specifically lost to robots.
On the other hand, Cetron and O'Toole, in their publica 
tions on the jobs of tomorrow, predict that millions of new 
jobs will be created by these same robots. According to 
them, "there will be as many as 1.5 million robotics techni 
cians on the job in the U.S. alone by 1990. ..." (Cetron and 
O'Toole, 1982a, p. 12 and 1982b, p. 259) These technicians 
will be needed for maintenance of robots for the most part. 
In a recent issue of Newsweek, which highlighted the growth 
industries and jobs of the future, the work of Cetron and 
O'Toole and others was referenced. That article included an 
estimate of total employment in industrial robot production 
in 1990 of 800,000. ("Growth Industries of the Future," p. 
83) If these numbers are believable, then over 2 million U.S. 
workers will be building or maintaining robots by 1990. At 
the same time, millions of other workers could be displaced 
by those robots.
Policymakers, lacking adequate information, must make 
do with whatever is available. Under these circumstances, 
even the Secretary of Labor can be misled. In a speech to the 
Productivity Advisory Committee, Secretary Donovan said, 
". . .there will be a major shift from production-line 
workers to versatile workers able to program, repair, and 
service the array of robots on the factory floor. In fact, by 
1990, half of the workers in any factory may well be 
engineers and technicians and other white collar specialists, 
rather than the current blue collar workers." (emphasis add 
ed)
This small sampling of currently available hyperbole 
about industrial robots contrasts sharply with the facts, in 
our judgment. The Robot Institute of America, the industry 
trade association of robot manufacturers and users of
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robots, predicts that there will be 75,000 to 100,000 robots in 
U.S. factories by 1990. (Robot Institute of America, p. 30) 
Indeed, even the most optimistic robot industry experts 
foresee no more than 150,000 robots by 1990. In interviews 
that we conducted, robot manufacturers were certainly en 
thusiastic about the growth prospects for their industry, but 
they deplored the "off-the-wall" predictions appearing in 
the popular media.
In any case, the application of as many as 150,000 in 
dustrial robots will not support cataclysmic employment im 
pacts, either in terms of job creation or job displacement. It 
is not reasonable to think that 1.5 million technicians are 
needed to maintain 150,000 robots, nor is it reasonable to 
suppose that 150,000 robots will displace millions of 
workers. Perhaps it makes interesting reading to claim that 
by 1990 employment in robot manufacturing will approx 
imate 800,000 people. But such a figure would surpass cur 
rent U.S. employment in the motor vehicle industry. Even 
more startling, a figure of 1.5 million robotics technicians by 
1990 would surpass current U.S. employment of all engineer 
ing and science technicians. While these and other wild 
claims about the impacts of robots may attract considerable 
media attention, they do not square with the facts, as we 
shall demonstrate in this monograph.
We agree that the robots are coming, but the near term 
employment impacts will not be overwhelming by any 
means. The impact of robots will be felt gradually and 
cumulatively through the years, an evolutionary rather than 
a revolutionary process. While these statements may not 
make headlines, we believe they can be shown to be accurate. 
In our opinion, the recent intense media attention on 
robotics may have seriously confused the issues and the 
policymakers.
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Scope and Purpose of the Study
This monograph will explore one aspect of the evolution 
of technology, the application of industrial robots to the 
manufacturing process. We focus on the human resource im 
plications of the industrial utilization of robotics technology 
rather than on the technology itself. More specifically, we 
estimate the job creation and job displacement potential of 
industrial robots in the U.S. by 1990. We also derive 
estimates of the impacts of robotics on one state in the na 
tion, the State of Michigan.
Robotics technology is important to Michigan for at least 
two major reasons. First, Michigan has traditionally relied 
on the "metalbending" business for a large share of its 
manufacturing exports. In particular, the dependence of the 
Michigan economy on auto and auto-related manufacturing 
is well-documented. This focus has led to a major concentra 
tion on manufacturing process technology as well. Thus 
Michigan already has a very substantial commitment to 
manufacturing and to manufacturing process technology.
Second, in 1981, Governor Milliken designated robotics 
technology as the highest priority in the drive to rebuild the 
Michigan economy with a high technology base. (Milliken, 
1981a, pp. 14-15; Milliken, 1981b, p. 13) Of course, the 
established stake in manufacturing process technology had a 
role in the selection. So did the circumstance that the auto in 
dustry, upon which Michigan has depended for so long, is 
the leader in the application of industrial robots to the 
manufacturing process. It was fairly obvious that industrial 
robots constituted a threat to the Michigan employment 
base. It was also obvious that the domestic auto industry had 
been facing intense competitive pressure from the Japanese, 
and that part of the Japanese cost advantage was emanating 
from their superior productivity. This in turn could be at 
tributed to the Japanese use of industrial robots, among 
other factors.
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In the face of this situation, the Governor's High 
Technology Task Force elected to try to make Michigan a 
world class center of excellence in manufacturing process 
technology, including but not limited to robotics technology. 
The centerpiece of this effort has become the development of 
the Industrial Technology Institute as an independent non 
profit corporation designed (1) to foster basic and applied 
research in manufacturing process technology, including the 
social and economic implications thereof, and (2) to provide 
practical assistance to Michigan manufacturers in both 
adopting and producing new manufacturing process 
technology. (Industrial Technology Institute, p. ii)
Because of the various initiatives of the State of Michigan 
and the belief that robotics technology might significantly 
affect the state's economy, the Michigan Occupational In 
formation Coordinating Committee (MOICC) asked the W. 
E. Upjohn Institute to look at the labor market implications 
of robotics in order to provide a base upon which human 
resource planning could proceed. The present monograph 
contains much of the information reported to MOICC in the 
Michigan study, but the major focus is on the national 
estimates. Thus, we regard the present volume as an exten 
sion of the earlier work.
This study is specifically targeted for policymakers and 
social researchers, particularly those involved in employment 
and training questions associated with robotics. No prior 
knowledge of industrial robots is assumed or needed. 
Technical questions about industrial robots are discussed on 
ly to the extent necessary.
There are precious little hard data about industrial robots 
today. Our data were gathered through published sources 
and through interviews with robot manufacturers, corporate 
users of robots, and other experts. While some judgment was 
undeniably necessary, we attempted to maintain objectivity
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throughout our efforts. Our methodology and judgments are 
explicitly stated in the study. This reflects our hope that this 
study will lead to other efforts to improve the understanding 
of the social and economic impacts of industrial robots.
A consistent framework is utilized in the study to evaluate 
the social and economic implications of industrial robots, 
particularly the job creation and job displacement caused by 
industrial robots. That means, for instance, that our projec 
tions of the population of robots in 1990 are consistent with 
our estimates of job displacement and job creation in that 
same year. Actually, we provide a range for the estimates 
because of the uncertainties involved, but the point is that 
the projections are consistent and comparable. This is very 
helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated conclusions.
The outline of the study is as follows. In chapter 2 we pre 
sent a selective review of other forecasts and then our 
forecast of the U.S. robot population in 1990. The chapter 
concludes with the derivation of the 1990 projected Michigan 
robot population. In chapter 3 we discuss the jobs to be 
eliminated by the robot population projected in chapter 2. 
That includes not only the number of jobs involved but also 
the specific occupations. In addition to this examination of 
job displacement, there is also a discussion of the possible 
unemployment impacts of robots. Chapter 4 is organized 
similarly but discusses the jobs that will be created as a result 
of industrial robots. In both chapters, the focus is on the 
United States and the State of Michigan. The conclusions of 
the study are presented in chapter 5.
Given the current lack of information about industrial 
robots, an annotated bibliography is also provided as part of 
the study. It is not necessarily complete, nor does it include 
the popular news magazines or many of the technical jour 
nals. However, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
compilation of an annotated research bibliography on the
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social and economic impacts of industrial robots. We hope 
the interested reader can use the annotations to identify 
items of interest; they cover a broad range, from the highly 
technical and mathematical economic literature of 
technological change to simple descriptions of robot 
characteristics.
In this introduction, the basic facts of robots are discussed 
first: What is a robot? What work can a robot do? Where are 
they currently being used? Then the place of robots in pro 
duction technology is assessed. Since robots are new 
technology, we discuss the development of two other related 
technologies, digital computers and numerically controlled 
machine tools. Next some historical antecedents, including 
the automation scare of the early 1960s, are considered. 
These suggested analogies will hopefully lead to some com 
mon ground upon which to develop a more dispassionate 
view of today's new technology industrial robots. Finally, 
we conclude chapter 1 with a discussion of a major study 
which has examined the job displacement effects of robots in 
great detail: the Carnegie-Mellon study. We believe misinter 
pretation of that study is responsible for some of the 
misunderstanding about industrial robots in the popular 
media.
What is a Robot?
Complete data on current installations of robots in the 
U.S. are not available. In part, that can be accounted for by 
confusion in defining exactly what constitutes a robot. A 
very broad definition originated with the Japan Industrial 
Robot Association, while the narrower definition used 
throughout this study originated with the Robot Institute of 
America (RIA) in 1979. The RIA definition was adopted by 
the llth International Symposium of Industrial Robots held 
in Tokyo, Japan in October 1981. However, it should be 
understood that international comparisons are still
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treacherous, and RIA and others have had to reevaluate the 
U.S. robot population. There is still not total agreement 
about U.S. installations of industrial robots and no one can 
be certain exactly how many robots there are in the U.S. to 
day.
The official RIA definition, now accepted internationally, 
is as follows:
A robot is a reprogrammable multifunctional 
manipulator designed to move material, parts, 
tools, or other specialized devices through variable 
programmed motions for the performance of a 
variety of tasks. (Robot Institute of America, p. 1)
The key to this definition is that a robot is a reprogram 
mable, multifunctional manipulator. A robot can perform 
the same task on identical workpieces repetitively; it can per 
form different tasks on the same workpiece; or it can be 
reprogrammed to perform entirely new tasks.
Unlike R2D2 and C3PO of the movie Star Wars, however, 
robots of today are essentially "dumb machines." They are 
generally immobile, they usually lack any visual or tactile 
sensory perception, and they cannot adapt to their environ 
ment in any way whatsoever. Generally they are no faster 
than human workers, but they are tireless. In layman's 
terms, that means a robot can reproduce a specific range of 
motions for which it has been programmed, but it does not 
know if it is really holding the part it is supposed to be or if 
the work was done correctly. Because of the robot's limita 
tions, it must be carefully interfaced with other equipment 
using mechanical and/or electrical switches to prevent 
disasters, and procedures must be established to verify the 
performance of the robot.
Essentially, then, robots are stationary machines with a 
manipulator arm that can perform motions repetitively and
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tirelessly. Unless the workpiece arrives at the exact location 
for which the arm is programmed, however, the robot will 
fail. If the workpiece is not of the size expected, or is 
oriented in the wrong position, the robot will fail. The bot 
tom line is that today's robot can only operate in a carefully 
structured and oriented world. Furthermore, although the 
literature makes much of the reprogrammability of robots, 
relatively few robots today are truly reprogrammed. Minor 
alterations may be made in the path of the manipulator of a 
welding robot, but most of today's robots perform the same 
program over and over and over again.
RIA's 1981 survey reports 4,700 robots in the U.S. by 
functional application area. (Robot Institute of America, p. 
3) By the end of 1982 we estimate that 6,800 to 7,000 robots 
were operating in U.S. factories. This should make it clear 
that most of the employment impacts to be discussed are in 
the future. The growth in application of industrial robots 
and the implications of that growth both have to be pro 
jected because of the very limited empirical base to date.
Robots perform a great variety of tasks today, but most 
are simple pick-and-place maneuvers such as loading or 
unloading machines, palletizing, etc. A common sequence 
might be as follows: the robot picks up the workpiece at a 
predetermined location, reorients it, places it in a machine 
tool for processing, removes it after processing, reorients it 
once again, places the item at a second predetermined loca 
tion and returns to the beginning. There are also 
sophisticated welding robots in which the manipulator (arm) 
can be programmed to follow a continuous path through 
space instead of simply going to various predetermined 
points. Control of the entire path of the arm also facilitates 
spray painting or application of other finishes.
In the auto industry, welding applications of robotics 
dominate today because auto production is particularly
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amenable to spot welding robots. There are only a limited 
variety of auto bodies, the assembly line can pre-position the 
parts precisely, and the environment can be perfectly 
organized because the nature of the work does not change. 
In short, it is a dull, repetitive, hazardous task that is ideally 
suited to today's robots. For these reasons, automakers are 
robotizing assembly line welding operations as normal 
retooling is done.
There are also pilot applications of robots for assembly 
tasks. However, assembly is generally a very complex task 
for today's "dumb" robots that cannot tell when the task is 
done correctly and must operate in a perfectly oriented and 
organized environment. Suffice it to say here that assembly 
robots are viewed as the number one growth application of 
the future. There are considerable ongoing research and 
development efforts in this area, but presently robots cannot 
perform most assembly tasks with consistency in an in 
dustrial environment at a reasonable cost. The trade 
literature implies that all of the problems will be solved very 
soon, and assembly robots will shortly thereafter proliferate 
in factories all over the world. Others are not so certain.
In sum, the proven applications of robots today are 
welding, painting, and various pick-and-place operations, 
while assembly tasks hold promise for the future. Given all 
of the media attention to robots, it is surprising that there are 
so few actually in operation. Part of the reason is to be 
found in the limited industrial applications perfected so far. 
For a more thorough technical (yet accessible) discussion of 
robot applications and capabilities, the interested reader 
should consult the book listed in the bibliography by Joseph 
L. Engelberger, generally acknowledged as the father of 
robotics.
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Robots in the Productive Process
The auto industry is the primary user of robots today. In 
fact, the auto industry pioneered many of the current robot 
applications and continues considerable research and 
development efforts in the industrial application of robots. 
Virtually all robots today are utilized in manufacturing 
firms, and the bulk are located in what might loosely be call 
ed metalcutting or metalbending industries (sometimes refer 
red to as the metalworking sector fabricated metal pro 
ducts, machinery, transportation equipment) and, to a lesser 
extent, in instruments and related products. Again, the sur 
prise is that so few industries are actually using robots, but it 
is also true that these industries are particularly concentrated 
in the five Great Lakes States.
Robots should be viewed as another form of automated 
equipment. Generally, we can think of two extremes: custom 
production or dedicated automation. In custom production, 
general purpose machines are usually hand operated by skill 
ed workers to produce a single item or small lots of that item. 
Capital equipment costs may be low but total unit costs are 
high because set-up time can be considerable, individual 
machining can be a demanding and time-consuming task, 
and all of the costs must be spread over a very small number 
of units produced. At the other extreme stands dedicated (or 
hard) automation, where the initial fixed capital investment 
can be quite high but total unit costs are typically very low 
because the automation of production increases speed and 
insures constant quality. The highly specialized equipment 
(dedicated automation) is set up once and thereafter produc 
tion of a single product can flow continuously.
Robots are not identified with either of these extremes. 
Set-up time for a robot exceeds that of a human operator in 
custom production, and the speed of a robot is no match for 
dedicated automated equipment. Instead, robots are a com-
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promise between these two extremes in terms of cost, flex 
ibility and capability. The fixed capital costs of a robot in 
stallation exceed that for custom production but are less than 
dedicated automation; total unit costs are likewise between 
the two extremes. In terms of capability, robots are no match 
for the subtle skills of a precision machinist, nor can a robot 
repeat a single task as perfectly as highly specialized 
automated equipment.
In terms of flexibility, the robot once again is no match for 
a skilled human operator that can adjust a workpiece, cor 
rect a minor flaw, and carefully check each and every piece 
as it is produced. On the other hand, the robot can do dif 
ferent tasks (if it is preprogrammed for those tasks), unlike 
dedicated automation which is capable of producing a single 
product only. Specialized hard automation sometimes must 
be scrapped when the product is changed, whereas in theory 
the robot can be reprogrammed to perform a new task at any 
time.
Despite the fact that robots represent a compromise be 
tween the extremes of custom production and dedicated 
automation in terms of cost, capability and flexibility, 
robots today are being applied primarily in mass production 
facilities where the human worker or the type of work itself 
already limits the speed of the overall facility. Thus they are 
serving primarily as a less expensive alternative to dedicated 
automation rather than being applied to automate batch pro 
duction facilities. The robot, once installed, appears to be 
just an extension of the dedicated automation.
Frequently, one robot that operates alone in the sense that 
it is not interfaced with other robots but only with the plant 
equipment which it services is termed a stand-alone unit or 
robot. In this lexicon, a robot system, then, is simply two or 
more robots that are integrated with each other and the plant 
equipment as necessary. Neither stand-alone robots nor
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robot systems require central computer control over the en 
tire operation, although sufficient limit switches are needed. 
Stand-alone robot installations dominate today and will con 
tinue to do so, at least through the mid-1980s; but robot 
systems will likely become more important later in the 
decade.
Some experts think that the greatest potential for robots in 
the future is the automation of small batch production 
facilities. (Ayres and Miller, 1981-82, p. 42) This encom 
passes the ability to reduce batch sizes in production that 
now require mass production or very large batch facilities 
(i.e., dedicated automation). The concept appears to pro 
mise a capability of production of a family of parts or pro 
ducts as the need arises. 1 Such systems are usually called flex 
ible manufacturing systems, but there is no universally ac 
cepted definition. It is unclear how the dedicated machinery 
for fabrication of manufactured articles would be designed 
for these new systems, but computer control appears para 
mount because the automation would require off-line pro 
gramming of robots and possibly other plant equipment to 
switch from batch to batch. Ultimately, the individual flexi 
ble manufacturing systems would be linked together and lead 
to the completely automated factory, what some people ap 
parently mean by the term "factory of the future." 2
However, flexible manufacturing systems will not 
dominate immediately and the completely automated factory 
is even farther in the future. Bela Gold, an economist at Case 
Western Reserve who has studied technological change for 
over 25 years, stresses the many human and economic prob-
1. The forerunners of these systems are machining centers in which one or more robots ser 
vice various numerically controlled machine tools to produce precision-cut metal parts. 
Such machining centers are available today.
2. The terms factory of the future, flexible manufacturing systems and others are en 
countered frequently in the popular media and trade literature, but they have no consensus 
definitions at this point.
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lems in moving toward the factory of the future. (Gold, 
1981a, pp. 30-32, pp. 37-38; and Gold, 1979, pp. 298-302, 
310-314) But there are also numerous technical problems. 
Computer memory systems today are quickly exhausted in 
controlling even a small manufacturing cell, let alone an en 
tire factory. (Albus, pp. 65-67; Alexander, p. 145; and 
Wisnosky, p. 22) The integration of individual automated 
systems in factories involves very complex problems of coor 
dination and transfer. Finally, among the technical problems 
in robots we note that there are no universal grippers, and 
off-line programming has not yet been perfected. (Gevarter, 
p. 37) Today's continuous path robots, for the most part, are 
"taught" their work task by physically moving the 
manipulator through the desired sequence of motions.
Our study is focused on the development and introduction 
of industrial robots and robot systems in manufacturing in 
dustries by 1990. Flexible manufacturing systems, the fac 
tory of the future, etc., are beyond the scope of the study 
because their impacts lie beyond 1990, except on an ex 
perimental basis. We simply do not find that this technology 
is sufficiently close to routine implementation to make ac 
curate predictions of its extent or its impact at this time.
Technological Analogies
Since the robot industry is very young today but does have 
a bright future, it is useful to compare it to other analagous 
technologies. Such analogies do not prove anything, but they 
can provide a perspective with which to assess the likely 
development and diffusion of industrial robots. We briefly 
review the development of digital computers, certainly one 
of the most significant technologies of several decades, and 
numerically controlled machine tools, the most closely 
related capital equipment to industrial robots.
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Before beginning, an important distinction is needed be 
tween product technology and process technology. As the 
names imply, product technology is the specific technology 
that is embedded in a final product, such as calculators or 
TV's, whereas process technology is the technology that is 
embedded in the capital equipment that makes the final pro 
ducts. Robots are definitely process technology and will like 
ly remain so in the foreseeable future. We do not see an early 
development of an extensive home market for robots. This 
distinction is important because there is ample evidence that 
new product technology tends to diffuse more rapidly than 
new process technology. (Gold, 1979, pp. 183-184; 
Mansfield, 1971b, pp. 77 and 84; and Sahal, p. 312)
The growth of digital computers from 1961 to 1979 is 
presented in table 1-1. The year 1961 was selected because 
that was the first year in which shipments of computers ex 
ceeded 2,000 units, roughly the position in which the robot 
industry finds itself today. The annual percentage increase in 
the total population of digital computers averaged 26 percent 
throughout the 19-year period. There were only three years 
in which annual shipments declined from the prior year level: 
1965, 1967, and 1975. Not surprisingly, relative growth was 
slightly higher in the earlier years when the total population 
of computers was smaller, but even in the most recent 
10-year period, 1969-1979, the annual growth in the popula 
tion of computers approximated 24 percent.
What does the growth of computers suggest for the growth 
of industrial robots, if anything? Digital computers can be 
classified as process technology in that the computer is not a 
direct part of the final product (microcomputers for the 
home market are excluded from the data). Rather, the com 
puter provides information processing cost accounting, 
recordkeeping, etc. that in turn supports the production of 
a final product. The revelation is that computers, widely 
heralded as the most significant technological innovation of
16 "The Robots are Coming''
the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of about 25 
percent. Yet some are implying vastly higher growth rates for 
industrial robots.
Table 1-1 
























































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and the 
Economy: A Chartbook, Bulletin 2084, October 1981, p. 100.
There are important differences between computers and 
robots that must be mentioned. It was realized almost from 
the beginning that computers were widely applicable in both
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business and government, but robots have only limited ap 
plications in the manufacturing sector today. An individual 
firm can potentially use many more robots than computers; 
however, robots are directly applied to the firm's production 
technique. This necessitates careful design, application and 
integration with the existing production process, while com 
puters are really an adjunct to the production process. There 
are obviously many differences between computers and 
robots that make comparisons hazardous, but the fact re 
mains that the growth of the most significant recent innova 
tion in process technology spread or diffused at a rate of 
about 25 percent annually.
The growth of numerically controlled machine tools is ex 
amined because they are more closely related to industrial 
robots. In fact, robots themselves can be regarded as 
machine tools. There is also an interesting parallel to 
robotics technology in the batch production mode. As with 
robots, numerically controlled machine tools were billed as 
capable of bringing mass production cost levels to batch pro 
duction processes because of their great flexibility through 
reprogramming.
Originally, numerical control meant that the machine tool 
(lathe, drill press, milling machine, etc.) was controlled by 
instructions contained on paper tape or cards, while today 
microprocessor control is becoming more common. The air 
craft industry, with research support of the U.S. govern 
ment, developed numerically controlled machine tools to im 
prove the precision of aircraft parts. This new process 
technology became available commercially in the mid-1950s; 
it was widely heralded as applicable in industry anywhere 
metalcutting was done. By the early 1960s, growth in 
employment of machine tool operators was thought to be 
seriously threatened. (Macut, pp. 1-6)
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The actual growth of numerically controlled machine tools 
from 1965 to 1981 is presented in table 1-2. Except for the 
years 1966-68, the growth of numerically controlled machine 
tools remained under 20 percent annually. In fact, in 7 of the 
16 years in the table, annual shipments declined from prior 
year levels. The annual growth rate was about 15 percent for 
the entire period, but averaged only 12 percent for the most 
recent 10-year period. After 25 years, only 3 to 4 percent of 
all metalcutting machine tools are numerically controlled. In 
short, the growth of numerically controlled machine tools 
has been much less than predicted.
There are many reasons why the growth of numerically 
controlled machine tools fell far short of expectations, but 
only three will be mentioned here. First, the applicability of 
numerical control technology to other industries was 
significantly overestimated. It appears to have no advantage 
over conventional machine tooling unless great precision or 
moderate sized batch production (but less than that needed 
for justification of dedicated machine tools) is required. 
(Nabseth and Ray, p. 45; and Mansfield, 1971a, p. 201) 
Clearly, there must be an opportunity to recover the increas 
ed capital investment costs of such technology if it is to be ef 
ficient.
Second, there was a significant lack of knowledge about 
numerical control, and the new technology not only altered 
the basic production structure but also required the new skill 
of programming. (Nabseth and Ray, p. 52; and Mansfield, 
197la, p. 201) Thus the human resource limitations were im 
portant as well. Third, the price of numerical control 
($150,000-$200,000 today for just the hardware) was perceiv 
ed by many small firms as too high. Many small shops sim 
ply do not have the capitalization to afford such in 
vestments. Even as recently as 1978, in a survey done of 
small machine tool firms of 50-100 employees who were 
nonusers of numerical control but likely candidates for
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utilization of the technology, it was found that over 72 per 
cent of the surveyed firms had not even evaluated numerical 
control. (Putnam, p. 100)
Table 1-2
Growth of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools 















































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, "Current Industrial Reports, Series MQ-35W, 
Metalworking Machinery," Annual Summaries, 1965-1980, and Quarterly Summaries, 
1981.
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Once again, too much can be made of the comparison be 
tween numerically controlled machine tools and robots, and 
there are substantial differences as well as similarities. 
However, the growth and diffusion of numerical control il 
lustrates the general obstacles to the rapid diffusion of pro 
cess technology in general. 3
Historical Analogies
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to develop a 
more rational perspective of technological change by briefly 
looking at two earlier new technologies related to robots, 
whereas the purpose of this section is to briefly discuss 
economic change in general. The fear of unemployment and 
massive displacement caused by labor-saving technology is 
not new. Such fears began with the dawn of the industrial era 
in the late 18th century; they continue today with the growth 
of industrial robots.
For example, the U.S. economy recovered very slowly 
from the deep 1958-59 recession and then experienced 
another recession in 1961. The "automation problem" was 
of urgent national concern, and in 1962 the U.S. Congress 
passed the Manpower Development and Training Act to ad 
dress the retraining needs of technologically displaced 
workers. Then, in 1964, the President appointed a National 
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic 
Progress to determine the impact of automation and 
technological change on the U.S. economy.
But the economy was already beginning to recover 
significantly in 1964, and by the time the Commission 
rendered its final report in 1966, the economy was near full 
employment. Historical events ultimately obviated the need 
for and impact of the Commission; the problem seemed to
3. The interested reader should consult the recent works of Sahal and Gold listed in the 
bibliography for a review of this literature.
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have gone away. To no one's surprise, the Commission's 
conclusion was that a sluggish economy was the major cause 
of unemployment rather than automation. (Bowen and 
Mangum, pp. 3-4)
The recessionary phase of any business cycle is difficult 
and traumatic for workers, particularly in a state like 
Michigan with its durable goods-oriented economy. The 
clear danger is that we may wrongly attribute the short run 
cyclical problem to other factors, such as automation. 
Walter Buckingham issued a grim forecast at the time of the 
1961 recession: "There are 160,000 unemployed in Detroit 
who will probably never go back to making automobiles, 
partly because the industry is past its peak of growth and 
partly because automation has taken their jobs." (Buck 
ingham, pp. 117-118) Subsequently, however, the auto in 
dustry set new employment peaks in the middle of the 1960s, 
and the auto-dominated Michigan economy boomed once 
again. (Verway, p. 1) We suffered through another such cy 
cle, although attenuated, with the 1974-75 recession. Yet the 
auto industry went on to its all-time peak employment in 
1978.
The general comparison between the early 1960s and the 
early 1980s appears compelling in our judgment. History 
does not and will not repeat itself, but history can provide a 
more objective perspective within which to judge the current 
(new) situation. Employment in the auto industry may not 
recover to its 1978 peak, but employment gains will be 
significant during the recovery phase of the business cycle.
Automation is not the cause of the U.S. or Michigan's 
unemployment today any more than it was in the early 
1960s. That is not to imply that we should take a "rah rah 
robots" approach to the coming technological change; 
however, neither should we adopt a doomsday attitude that 
attributes most or all unemployment during major recessions
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to automation. In fact, one might plausibly argue that some 
of our basic industries suffer more today from a lack of 
automation and the rational organization of that automation 
vis-a-vis our European and Japanese competitors than from 
too much automation.
It is possible to develop a more dispassionate view of 
technological change, or more specifically, of the introduc 
tion of industrial robots. First, let us admit that most 
technological change throughout American history has been 
labor-saving, and that means job displacement. By job 
displacement we mean the elimination of job tasks, not 
necessarily implying worker unemployment. As will be 
discussed later, they are not the same thing by any means.
The powerful job displacing effect of technological change 
is illustrated in table 1-3; it lists hypothetical job displace 
ment in manufacturing in the U.S. and Michigan from 1979 
to 1990, assuming a fixed output and a continuation of the 
slow annual growth in output per worker experienced in the 
late 1970s of 2.1 percent. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981c, 
p. 24) The base year employment for the calculations is 1978. 
Under the unrealistic assumption of constant output, if the 
annual growth in output per worker of 2.1 percent continues 
throughout the decade of the 1980s, then cumulative job 
displacement by 1990 will approximate 4.6 million in the 
U.S. and 265,000 jobs in manufacturing in Michigan.
Stated in relative terms, 22 percent of all existing jobs in 
manufacturing could disappear by 1990 as a result of in 
creases in productivity. Of course, worker productivity gains 
are not solely the result of new labor-saving technologies, 
but the total effect is the same; gains in productivity, 
whatever the source, can cause considerable and sometimes 
dramatic displacement effects on the existing job base if they 
are examined in isolation.
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Table 1-3
Illustrative Displacement Impact of General 









































NOTE: The 1978 base year employment figures are 1,179,600 for Michigan and 20,505,000 
for the U.S., as found in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ 
ment and Earnings, May 1981, pp. 39 and 125.
Second, the dramatic job displacing effects of 
technological change have not caused massive unemploy 
ment in the American economic system because in normal 
times they have been accompanied by significant economic 
growth, i.e., output has not been constant. Displaced 
workers are reemployed in other sectors of the economy, or 
they may gain new jobs in the same firm if demand increases 
sufficiently after the introduction of new technology. The 
heart of the problem appears to be the perception that there 
is only a constant amount of work to be done, so a machine 
or robot eliminates not only the job task but also the need 
for that worker. Historically, this has not generally been 
true.
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Third, the association of technological change and 
economic growth is not just a coincidence; the two are inter 
twined and inseparable. That is not to imply that adoption of 
new technologies necessarily insures economic growth, or 
that displaced workers will always find new jobs. However, 
it does mean that we all have a vital stake in productivity 
gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) because that is what allows the 
possibility of economic growth. The price of a growing, 
dynamic economy that raises incomes and makes more 
goods and services available to all of us is job displacement, 
or the elimination of jobs through technological change.
Fourth, although the long-run impact of technological 
change has been favorable on the American economy, job 
displacement in the short run can be traumatic for the 
workers involved, who usually are concentrated 
geographically and occupationally. Displaced workers may 
find it difficult to learn new tasks. Severely impacted regions 
may not have the resources to cope with those displaced. Job 
displacement in the short run may require significant public 
and/or private retraining efforts. Furthermore, the public 
education system must insure that entry-level workers 
possess the requisite new skills and not old, obsolete skills.
Finally, we must guard against the temptation to view 
technological change as revolutionary; the fear that tomor 
row we will awaken to the unmanned factory and a world of 
robots without workers. Technological change tends to be 
evolutionary, especially in process technology. There are 
physical, financial, and human constraints on the rate of 
change of process technology. While no one would dispute 
that computers have changed our world, this has taken a 
quarter of a century.
In summary, industrial robots are simply one more piece 
of automated industrial equipment, part of the long history 
of automation of production. Robots will displace workers
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in the same way that technological change has always 
displaced workers. There is a possibility that this job 
displacement will be a significant problem, particularly in 
given occupations, industries, or geographical areas. These 
questions are examined later in the study. There is also the 
certainty that robots will create jobs, and that also is examin 
ed later in the study. Robots will not guarantee economic 
growth and we cannot be assured that displaced workers will 
be reemployed, although there is reason for some optimism 
historically. In the short run, there will likely be some worker 
dislocation, and that dislocation may be concentrated 
geographically. Policy issues raised by these changes will be 
addressed after their magnitude is determined.
The Carnegie-Mellon Study
We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the only 
study which has examined the job displacement impacts of 
robots in great detail, the Carnegie-Mellon study. Actually 
the Carnegie-Mellon study is not one published document, 
but several that originated from a project in which Robert 
Ayres and Steven Miller were the principal investigators. 
(Ayres and Miller, 198la)
The fundamental basis of the job displacement estimates 
of Ayres and Miller is a survey of corporate users of robots 
(with 16 respondents) that asked them to provide estimates 
of potential job displacement in 32 occupations by today's 
commercially available robots (Level 1) and tomorrow's 
robots that would be sensor-based with rudimentary tactile 
and/or visual perception (Level 2). The occupations were 
chosen by Ayres and Miller as those most likely to be 
robotized. The responses were weighted by size of firm (six 
classes) to obtain a weighted average response. These sam 
pled occupations were then combined with other nonsampl- 
ed occupations (based on similarity) and job displacement
26 "The Robots are Coming"
estimates were derived for the metalworking sector and for 
all manufacturing.
Perhaps Ayres and Miller best summarize their conclu 
sions in a Technology Review article:
Based on these results, we estimate that Level 1 
robots could theoretically replace about 1 million 
operators, and Level 2 robots could theoretically 
replace 3 million of a current total of 8 million 
operators. However, this displacement will take at 
least 20 years. By 2025, it is conceivable that more 
sophisticated robots will replace almost all 
operators in manufacturing (about 8 percent of to 
day's workforce), as well as a number of routine 
nonmanufacturing jobs. (Ayres and Miller, 1982b, 
p. 42)
According to Ayres and Miller, 4 million manufacturing 
operative jobs are subject to robotization over the next 20 
years or more, and all operatives in manufacturing may be 
replaced by 2025. The emphasis is clearly on theoretical 
displacement in the indefinite future rather than actual or 
probable displacement by some specific date.
We doubt that production techniques, even theoretically, 
are as homogeneous across manufacturing as Ayres and 
Miller imply; by industry, by size of firm, or by type of pro 
duct. But those doubts are minor in the context of theoretical 
estimation of the unbounded future. As Ayres and Miller 
themselves point out, their estimates are really only rough 
guesses to obtain "a feeling of how many people will be in 
volved in 'first order' adjustment processes." (Ayres and 
Miller, 1981a, p. 100)
Ayres and Miller go on to conclude that their study has 
highly significant policy implications. They talk of an "in 
stitutional failure" in that our public education and training
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programs reflect obsolete rather than emerging needs. (Ayres 
and Miller, 198la, pp. 22-23) They are particularly critical of 
CETA, vocational schools and government occupational 
forecasters, none of which in their opinion recognize the 
future employment needs of society. (Ayres and Miller, 
1982a, p. 21) Ayres and Miller conclude, "the transition to 
the factory of the future is occurring now. ... If ap 
propriate measures are not taken, the nation will experience 
unnecessary economic distress and lost opportunities." 
(Ayres and Miller, 1982b, p. 46)
We do not concur with Ayres and Miller that their 
estimates of theoretical displacement by occupation at some 
undefined point in the future are proof that our public in 
stitutions today are training their clientele in obsolete skills. 
Furthermore, Ayres and Miller offer no evidence whatsoever 
about the emerging occupations, so their criticism in that 
regard is especially puzzling. In our judgment, if policy 
responses to the challenges of the future are to be for 
mulated, including the possible effects of robotics 
technology, then the assessment must proceed based upon 
the most likely or probable events that are expected to occur 
within a definite time horizon. That is what we will endeavor 
to do in the remainder of the study.
